Author: Katja Gloger & Georg Mascolo
_Katja Gloger & Georg Mascolo_
Reading time: 27 minutes
Synopsis
The Failure (2025) shows how German politicians saw warning signs about Russia for decades. But they always pushed these signs aside. We explain why old beliefs stayed, even with wars and clear rule-breaking. In the end, it becomes clear how this way of thinking slowly led to a terrible dead end.
What you will learn: Understand how German politicians failed in dealing with Russia.
Russia’s attack on Ukraine in February 2022 surprised many people. But for others, it felt like the end of a long story. The disaster did not start with this attack. It began with decisions made years, even decades, before. We look back at the time of Chancellors Helmut Kohl, Gerhard Schröder, and Angela Merkel.
This is about phone calls, gas pipelines, and when talks (diplomacy) stop working. How did Russia get to use its gas and oil supplies to pressure others? Why did German politicians stay friendly with Russia, even though Russia was aggressive many times? Did the leaders not know about Putin’s plans, or did they ignore warnings?
We answer these questions. We show Germany’s policy towards Russia from the early 1990s until February 2022.
Blink 1 – After the Soviet Union broke up, people hoped for a stable, united Europe.
In the early 1990s, there was a feeling of new beginnings in Berlin. The Berlin Wall had fallen. Germany was united again. Mikhail Gorbachev, leader of the Soviet Union, had agreed to the reunification. In December 1991, he also stepped down as General Secretary of the Communist Party’s Central Committee. He announced the end of the Soviet Union. He handed power to Boris Yeltsin, who became the first president of the new Russian Federation.
In terms of foreign policy, a new period started in Europe. Many saw this as a special chance in history. For the first time, a stable European peace without different groups (blocs) seemed possible.
Because of this, Germany wanted to get closer to Russia. They supported working together in business. They were careful about criticizing Russia’s internal politics. But there were reasons to criticize, for example in October 1993.
Then, President Boris Yeltsin ordered tanks to fire on the parliament building. He did this to win a power struggle with the parliament. Hundreds of people died. Even so, Chancellor Helmut Kohl supported Yeltsin. Kohl saw Yeltsin as a person who would bring reforms and stability. The violence was seen as a sign of a difficult change from the Soviet Union to a modern Russia.
This approach did not change when the German government changed in 1998. In fact, under Gerhard Schröder, the policy towards Russia became more personal. After Putin became President of Russia in early 2000, Schröder became friends with him.
The German Chancellor often said that Russia was a reliable partner that was changing. The idea that economic cooperation could help political development became the main rule of Schröder’s Russia policy.
So, in the 1990s, Germany developed a way of thinking about Russia. Later decisions were based on this. Russia was not seen as an aggressor hungry for power. Instead, it was seen as a partner in a historical learning process.
Blink 2 – Gerhard Schröder made Russia policy his top priority.
When Vladimir Putin became President of Russia in early 2000, people in Berlin first saw him as a temporary leader. He was a former secret service officer, not well-known, and seemed serious. German reports described him as practical. They said he wanted to make the chaotic Russia of the Yeltsin years stable.
But Putin mainly wanted one thing: to increase his own power. He removed governors he didn’t like. Political opponents were pushed aside. New laws limited media freedom. At the same time, the power of Russia’s security services grew.
All of this was mentioned in German reports about Russia’s development. But for Schröder, this was not very important. More important was whether Russia stayed predictable overall. As long as business cooperation worked and Putin was willing to talk about foreign policy, Schröder wanted to keep the partnership.
One example was the regular talks between the German and Russian governments. These started in the early 2000s. They followed a fixed routine. Weeks before the meetings, ministries began preparing. The Chancellor’s office collected information from the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Economics, and the Interior Ministry. They decided which topics would be discussed and which would not.
Economy, energy, and strategic cooperation were top priorities. Notes about media freedom or political repression appeared in internal documents. But they usually did not make it into the main discussion points.
The actual meetings happened behind closed doors. These were small gatherings in the Chancellor’s office or the Kremlin. Often, only interpreters and close advisors were present. Afterwards, there were carefully planned press conferences. Here, positive words like „partnership“, „mutual trust“, and „shared responsibility for Europe“ were often used. If there were disagreements, they spoke of „different views“, not „conflicts“.
But the journey from Berlin to Moscow or back is long. So, after Putin became president, a direct line was set up between the German Chancellor’s office and the Kremlin. In very difficult situations, they would use this phone line to reduce tensions early.
For example, during the Second Chechen War.
Blink 3 – The Second Chechen War was the first warning sign. German politicians did not act on it.
By autumn 2000, the Second Chechen War had been going on for months. Russian troops had taken back the region in the North Caucasus that had broken away. They used massive force. Whole streets in Grozny were destroyed. There were reports of civilians dying and systematic human rights abuses. Moscow called this action an anti-terror operation.
German politicians followed this view. They did not see Russia’s aggression as an international war. Instead, they saw it as a conflict inside Russia. Even though Russia was very brutal, the war was treated as Russia’s internal matter under international law.
The situation was discussed in a small group in the Chancellor’s office. They could not stay silent. The reports about Russia’s brutality were too loud. They thought about publicly condemning Russia. But this idea was quickly dropped. The internal reason was: It would harm relations with Russia. And it would not change the situation on the ground.
Instead, they chose a direct way. Gerhard Schröder picked up the phone – the direct line – and spoke directly with Vladimir Putin. The conversation was private, with no public record and no statement for the press. Schröder mentioned the reports of civilian victims. He asked for restraint and spoke about international criticism.
Putin, however, defended his actions with security reasons. He said Russia was only defending its territory against separatist terrorists. He said Russia needed to get control again. He made no promises.
Shortly after, Schröder spoke to the press. He did not criticize strongly. Instead, he said something like: they had talked, they would stay in dialogue, and Russia faced difficult security challenges.
In the following weeks, Germany’s stance did not change. There were no new demands, no consequences, no rethinking of relations with Russia. The war continued.
And it was just the start of more aggressive acts by Putin.
Blink 4 – Angela Merkel’s words towards Russia became tougher. But she did not change the political path.
When the government changed in 2005, Germany’s way of dealing with Russia changed. Angela Merkel took over from Gerhard Schröder. The personal closeness changed to a serious distance. Merkel was more factual with Russia. She avoided showing closeness and spoke more openly about Russia becoming more authoritarian. However, the main political idea stayed the same: Merkel also focused on talks and partnership.
This plan was tested heavily in August 2008.
The war in Georgia caused this test. Georgia’s friendly approach to the West and its wish to join NATO bothered Putin. On the night of August 8, Putin used clashes between Georgian and separatist forces as a reason to send in Russian troops. Within a few days, they crossed Georgia’s internationally recognized border. They bombed military and civilian targets. They moved far into the country.
Putin’s goal was not just to control the separatist areas. It was also a political message. Moscow was ready to use military force. It wanted to keep its areas of influence and stop former Soviet countries from getting closer to the West. This was a new level of aggression.
In Germany, the Second Chechen War was seen as a conflict inside a country. But the war in Georgia was Russia’s first open attack on a neighboring country. This broke international law. It should have made Germany rethink its strategy with Russia.
But in Berlin, the German government reacted as usual: with diplomatic talks. There were phone calls and high-level meetings. But Putin did not call back his troops.
Publicly, Angela Merkel used careful language. She called Russia’s actions „unacceptable“. She stressed that Georgia’s borders must be respected. However, she avoided words like war of aggression, aggression, or breaking the European order.
Instead, she pointed to the long history in the Caucasus. She mentioned unsolved conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Foreign Minister at the time, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, agreed with this view. He also focused on mediation and calming things down. He warned against isolating Russia. In his statements, he spoke about shared responsibility and how both sides were making things worse. So, the war did not seem like an aggressive act by Moscow. It seemed like the result of a complicated local conflict.
Together, Merkel and Steinmeier made sure the Georgia war was handled politically. It was condemned, but not seen as a turning point. So, nothing stood in the way of the German-Russian partnership continuing.
Blink 5 – Under Merkel, Germany became more dependent on Russian energy. This dependence had started under Schröder.
Important energy projects from Schröder’s time were not just continued under the CDU. They were completed. The Nord Stream pipeline under the Baltic Sea was finished as planned. It started working in November 2011. This happened despite security concerns within Germany itself.
Especially in the Foreign Office, people warned more and more that energy could no longer be seen separately. Gas deliveries were not just a normal market process. They were part of Russia’s power politics. Internal papers noted that Russia used supply deals to gain political influence.
A key part of these analyses was about the ‘transit countries’. Until 2011, much of Russia’s gas went to Germany through countries like Ukraine. This gave these countries political power. As long as Russia needed their pipelines, it had to be careful with them. With Nord Stream, this changed completely. The pipeline went directly through the Baltic Sea to Germany. It completely bypassed Ukraine, for example.
This shift in power was mentioned in internal papers. However, it was not a high political priority. From Germany’s point of view, the main thing was that the gas arrived reliably. So, the Ministry of Economics believed that energy policy needed to be predictable, have stable prices, and follow market rules. The Chancellor’s office agreed with this. The safety and bargaining power of the transit countries became less important.
This had terrible results. In 2014, Russia took over Crimea from Ukraine. This would have been almost impossible without the Nord Stream pipeline. Before, a growing conflict with Ukraine would have also put gas supplies to Western Europe at risk. Ukraine could have stopped the deliveries. This would have made Russia lose important income.
Also, countries that bought gas, like Germany, would probably have put much more pressure on Russia. They would have demanded that Ukraine restart gas supplies. After Nord Stream was built, this power was largely gone.
From 2014, it became clear what had been warned about internally. Building direct energy links not only had economic effects. It also greatly changed the balance of power in Eastern Europe. This was bad for Ukraine and very good for Russia.
But this did not stop German politicians from making Germany even more dependent on Russian energy.
Blink 6 – Even Russia taking over Crimea did not break relations with Russia.
After Russia took over Crimea in 2014, the situation in Berlin was clearer than ever. In ministries, security agencies, and embassies, everyone agreed. They saw that Russia had clearly broken international law. The old idea of having influence through partnership had clearly failed.
In the Foreign Office, experts on Eastern Europe and experienced diplomats clearly stated this problem. They warned against treating Russia taking over Crimea as a one-time event. Russia had shown it would not stop at internationally recognized borders. Around the BND (German intelligence service), it was stressed that economic ties had not stopped Russia. Stopping future actions and lowering risks had to be rethought.
In the Chancellor’s office under Angela Merkel, Putin was also seen more critically now. Germany played a big part in EU sanctions against Russia. First, travel bans and asset freezes were put on those responsible for taking over Crimea. From summer 2014, economic measures followed. Russian state banks got limited access to European money markets. Also, weapon exports and certain energy technologies were forbidden.
Because of the sanctions, Russia’s economy (GDP) clearly shrank in 2015. But Putin’s most important source of income was not touched: energy supplies to Europe. Europe, and Germany especially, continued to get gas and oil from Russia. The existing pipeline system was also not affected.
So, despite all criticism of Russia, Angela Merkel stuck to the partnership. From her point of view, ending all political contact would not lead to more safety. Instead, it would increase the risks even more. Merkel feared that a Russia with a weak economy could become even more unpredictable.
This view also shaped Germany’s efforts for the Minsk agreements. After heavy fighting in eastern Ukraine, Germany and France helped Russia and Ukraine talk. The agreements included ceasefires, among other things. But Russia only partly kept to them. This did not surprise Merkel.
She did not expect Russia to stick to the Minsk agreements forever. For her, the important thing was that there was a framework at all to have some influence. Even if it was only about limiting damage. Merkel wanted to keep the direct line to Putin open.
So, the belief from the 90s that a partnership could make Russia less aggressive continued. Because of this logic, nothing stopped the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project either. This was another direct link for gas supplies from Russia to Germany. It was actually decided after the attack on Crimea.
The public reason followed a known pattern. Nord Stream 2 was called „a purely economic project“ that private companies were responsible for. Despite all the warning signs, energy policy was again separated from national and European security policy.
So, under Merkel, a contradictory policy was created. On one hand, the German government said Russia had broken the European peace order. On the other hand, it pushed for a project that further strengthened Russia’s position as a main energy supplier.
How bad the Russia policy of Merkel, Schröder, Kohl, and their governments was, became fully clear in 2022. This was with Russia’s attack on mainland Ukraine.
What can we learn from this?
Blink 7 – Good intentions must not hide hard facts.
If you treat authoritarian states as partners for years, even when they use military force, you do not strengthen peace. This is the tough lesson from Germany’s Russia policy after the Soviet Union broke apart. We can learn three things from this.
First: Information was always available. About Putin gaining power, about wars in Chechnya and Georgia, about energy as a political tool. These findings were not completely ignored. But they had no political effects. The main thing was always not to harm relations with Russia too much, so talks could continue. But this approach became an end in itself. In the future, German politicians must take security analyses more seriously.
Second: Foreign policy needs an institutional memory. The same warnings came up again and again over the years. About dependencies, risks of things getting worse, and wrong assumptions. Still, decisions were made as if each crisis was new. Projects like Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 were continued, even though their risks were well-known. Future policy must systematically record what turned out to be wrong judgments. And it must draw clear conclusions from them.
Third: Politics needs real ability to accept disagreement. Critical voices from ministries, security agencies, and diplomats existed. But they rarely guided actions. They were seen as warners, not as guides for direction. The result was a policy that managed conflicts. But it never truly changed Germany’s relationship with Russia. If you want security, you must not only listen to criticism, but also give it importance.
All of this shows us something very uncomfortable. Democracies fail not because they know too little. They fail because they want to stick to what they know and believe in. Peace does not come from talking at any cost. It comes when uncomfortable truths are accepted early. And when actions are taken before it’s too late.
Summary
German policy towards Russia did not fail suddenly or because of a lack of knowledge. It failed step by step, over three decades, under different governments.
In the 1990s, everything began with hope. German unity, the end of the Soviet Union, the belief in a united Europe. Russia was not seen as a powerful state. It was seen as a partner going through a change. Violence, returns to authoritarian rule, and abuse of power were seen as side effects of a difficult learning process.
Under Gerhard Schröder, this approach became the main idea. Personal closeness replaced political distance. Economic ties were seen as a way to secure peace. Warning signs, like the Second Chechen War or stopping critical media, had no political effects. The relationship with Russia should not be strained.
With Angela Merkel, the tone changed, but not the direction. Even when Russia openly attacked a neighboring state in Georgia in 2008 for the first time, German politicians kept their partnership with Russia. Dependence on Russian energy supplies grew.
By 2014, at the latest, with Russia taking over Crimea, there should have been a turning point. Because there was no doubt anymore: Russia was ready to move borders by force. Economic ties did not change this. But there was no break in relations. Instead, Nord Stream 2 further strengthened Russia’s role as a key energy supplier.
All this happened despite internal warnings. The attack on Ukraine in 2022 cannot be seen as an unforeseen shock. It is just the result of Russia’s development under Putin. This development began soon after he took power.
Thank you for listening, and see you next time.
Source: https://www.blinkist.com/https://www.blinkist.com/de/books/das-versagen-de